The interdepartmental commission voiced preliminary causes of the breakdown at the Bishkek Heating and Power Plant. The Public Relations and Mass Media Department of the Government of Kyrgyzstan reported.
It was found out that gross violations of the rules and guidelines, as well as the functional responsibilities were allowed by the officials of Electric Stations OJSC that had resulted in emergency shutdown of the equipment responsible for the supply of heat.
Preliminary cause of technological disruption were the uncoordinated actions of the operational personnel in a decrease in the level of chemically desalinated water in the tanks, which aggravated the emergency situation.
The personnel and equipment of Bishkek HPP was not prepared for drop in the air temperature to −30 degrees, but the management of Electric Stations JSC sent a telephone message on January 23 to the HPP to take urgent measures for prevention of emergency shutdowns due to the cold snap.
Despite this, since January 24, the consumption of chemically insoluble water has been increased 1.5 times. In the following days, the consumption of water for washing and heating the boilers, regenerating the filters, preparing of the third unit for switching it on, has been increasing.
When clarifying the circumstances of lowering the level of chemically desalinated water, it was established that the sensors in the tanks were frozen, and their readings did not correspond to the actual state of the system, the manometers of the operating pumps turned out to be air-filled. At the opening of the filter-traps pumps, fragments of the rubber coating of the pipeline were found in them. The operational staff could not determine in a timely manner the non-standard operating mode of the water supplying equipment, each shop operated independently, without general coordination.
Freezing of external impulse tubes, instrumentation and automation at the disconnected boiler units contributed to further aggravation of the situation. In order to prevent the freezing of the boilers, they were drained, but water remained in the impulse tubes and the pipelines leading to the boilers.
Holes appeared when filling the boilers with water. The water was drained and re-filled. At the same time, the frozen impulse tubes and supply pipelines were warmed up by open fire. It took a lot of time.
The third block of HPP could not be switched on in due time because of the lack of chemically desalinated water for feeding the boiler.